|
課程名稱 |
經濟國策專題研究
Seminar on Economic Statecraft |
|
開課學期 |
109-1 |
|
授課對象 |
社會科學院 政治學研究所 |
|
授課教師 |
蘇翊豪 |
|
課號 |
PS8565 |
|
課程識別碼 |
322 D1530 |
|
班次 |
|
|
學分 |
2.0 |
|
全/半年 |
半年 |
|
必/選修 |
選修 |
|
上課時間 |
星期五6,7(13:20~15:10) |
|
上課地點 |
|
|
備註 |
上課地點為社科研602教室。國際關係、公共行政、本國政治、比較政治。
限博士班
總人數上限：5人
外系人數限制：1人 |
|
|
|
|
課程簡介影片 |
|
|
核心能力關聯 |
核心能力與課程規劃關聯圖 |
|
課程大綱
|
|
為確保您我的權利,請尊重智慧財產權及不得非法影印
|
|
課程概述 |
經濟國策研究國家如何運用經濟手段達成政治目標，學者通常將經濟國策區分為正向的誘導與負向的強制作法，本專題依循此光譜，先分別探討援助、貿易、投資、制裁之類型、運作、及效果，隨後分析經濟國策對國家發展、軍事衝突、人權保護等層面的影響。本課程亦將採取案例討論法，修課學生將在各週第二節課以15分鐘，口頭報告自己感興趣的國家或事件案例，接受同儕提問不同案例的共通與相異性，藉此思考當週讀本介紹的理論適用程度，以及相關實務意涵。
Week 1: 經濟國策概述
Week 2: 經濟國策分析框架
Week 3: 經濟援助種類與發起
Week 4: 經濟協定種類與發起
Week 5: 經濟制裁種類與發起
Week 6: 經濟國策與國家發展
Week 7: 經濟國策與政商關係
Week 8: 經濟國策與政權存續
Week 9: 經濟國策與國際談判
Week 10: 經濟國策與軍事衝突
Week 11: 經濟國策與兩岸關係
Week 12: 經濟國策與核武擴散
Week 13: 經濟國策與人權保護
Week 14: 經濟國策與非傳統安全
Week 15: 經濟國策與政府反制
Week 16: 經濟國策的終止
Week 17: 期末口頭報告一
Week 18: 期末口頭報告二 |
|
課程目標 |
1. 理解經濟國策的定義與種類；
2. 掌握經濟國策上中下游研究的分析框架；
3. 瞭解經濟國策理論與其他國際關係、外交政策理論的關聯；
4. 懂得如何適用理論以解釋案例，以及透過案例反思理論；
5. 認識實務界運用經濟國策的動機、形式、與考量。 |
|
課程要求 |
成績評量方式與標準
（請說明各項評量項目內容設計、比例及標準）Grading 平時成績15%，包含課前提問與課堂參與。
案例報告15%，學生可任選案例，探討與當週介紹的理論有否牴觸與相容。
文獻回顧15%，針對任一主題的文獻探討，修改後的內容可用於期末書面報告。
口頭報告15%，發表當前書面報告研究進度與成果，由授課老師與學生提供建議。
期末報告40%，針對任一研究問題進行解釋或詮釋研究。
本課程對學生課後學習之要求
Requirements for students after the class: 1. 學生每堂課前須熟讀當週文本，並在每週四晚間11:59以前，在CEIBA討論區上提出至少1個問題。授課教師根據問題重要與相關性排列，供隔日課堂討論。
2. 本課程任何報告內容不得與其他課程重覆，經授課教師發現或同學舉報後查證屬實，將倒扣該作業成績至少50%。如報告主題和其他課程有正當承接關係，請與授課老師商量。
3. 發表人簡報案例時，其餘同學務必認真聆聽與發問，案例討論階段的參與表現列入平時成績計算。 |
|
預期每週課後學習時數 |
|
|
Office Hours |
|
|
指定閱讀 |
|
|
參考書目 |
指定閱讀(請詳述每週指定閱讀) Required readings
延伸閱讀(請詳述每週延伸閱讀) Extension readings
Part Ⅰ基礎
Week 1: 經濟國策概述
David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1985), Ch.3 “What is Economic Statecraft?” Ch.4 “Thinking about Economic Statecraft,” Ch.5 “Economic Statecraft in International Thought.”
管仲，《管子：輕重戊》，https://ctext.org/guanzi/qing-zhong-v/zh。
Week 2: 經濟國策分析框架
Jeffry A. Frieden, David A. Lake, and Kenneth A. Schultz, World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), Ch. 2 “Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions.”
John Kurt Jacobsen, “Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy,” World Politics 47, 2 (1995): 283–310.
George E. Shambaugh, States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign Policy, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), Ch. 1 “The Puzzle and Argument: Dominance, Dependence, and Political Power.”
劉蕭翔，〈國際政治與國內政治互動之評析〉，《歐洲國際評論》，第3期（2007）：107–136。
Week 3: 經濟援助種類與發起
林碧炤，《國際政治與外交政策》，（臺北：五南圖書出版，2013），第13章「經濟的因素」。
Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth 5 (2000): 33–63.
Axel Dreher et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa,” International Studies Quarterly 62, 1 (2018): 182–194.
龔祥生，〈國內政經聯盟對日本經濟外交政策之影響—以對中國大陸有償借貸為例〉，《東亞研究》，第45卷，第2期（2014）：69–121。
Week 4: 經濟協定種類與發起
Jennifer L. Tobin and Marc L. Busch, “A BIT Is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements,” World Politics 62, 1 (2010): 1–42.
Gabriele Spilker, Thomas Bernauer, and Victor Umana, “Selecting Partner Countries for Preferential Trade Agreements: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam,” International Studies Quarterly 60, 4 (2016): 706–718.
Todd Allee and Clint Peinhardt, “Evaluating Three Explanations for the Design of Bilateral Investment Treaties,” World Politics 66, 1 (2014): 47–87.
劉致賢，〈經濟國策與企業行為：「一帶一路」倡議與中國大陸石油與鐵路產業的發展〉，《中國大陸研究》，第61卷，第4期（2018）：31–55。
王國臣，〈美中貿易戰下中國大陸的國際戰略〉，《經濟前瞻》，第186期（2019），45–52。
Week 5: 經濟制裁種類與發起
William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, “Unilateral Versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective,” International Studies Quarterly 43, 1 (1999): 37–58.
Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57, 3 (2003): 643–59.
Benn Steil and Robert E. Litan, Financial Statecraft: The Role of Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), Ch. 1 “What is Financial Statecraft?”
Daniel W. Drezner, “Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance,” International Interactions 41, 4 (2015): 755–764.
Taehee Whang, “Playing to the Home Crowd? Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States: Playing to the Home Crowd?” International Studies Quarterly 55, 3 (2011): 787–801.
Part Ⅱ 主題
Week 6: 經濟國策與國家發展
Ashok Kumar Pankaj, “Revisiting Foreign Aid Theories,” International Studies 42, 2 (2005): 103–121.
Joseph Wright, “To Invest or Insure? How Authoritarian Time Horizons Impact Foreign Aid Effectiveness,” Comparative Political Studies 41, 7 (2008): 971–1000.
Matthias Neuenkirch and Florian Neumeier, “The Impact of UN and US Economic Sanctions on GDP Growth,” European Journal of Political Economy 40 (2015): 110–125.
Sylvanus Kwaku Afesorgbor and Renuka Mahadevan, “The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality of Target States,” World Development 83 (2016): 1–11.
Week 7: 經濟國策與政商關係
Clifton T. Morgan and Navin A. Bapat, “Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion,” International Studies Review 5, 4 (2003): 65–79.
Bryan R. Early, “Sleeping with Your Friends’ Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade,” International Studies Quarterly 53, 1 (2009): 49–71.
楊昊，〈再探東南亞「外援」政治：發展、變革與在地回應〉，《遠景基金會季刊》，第19卷，第3期（2018）：109–156。
Bryan R. Early and Keith A. Preble, “Going Fishing versus Hunting Whales: Explaining Changes in How the US Enforces Economic Sanctions,” Security Studies 29, 2 (2020): 231–267.
Yi-hao Su, “Trade Plants the Flag: Sanctions-busting and the Signing of New Preferential Trade Agreements,” Foreign Policy Analysis, (2020), Online First.
Week 8: 經濟國策與政權存續
Richard A. Nielsen, “Rewarding Human Rights? Selective Aid Sanctions against Repressive States,” International Studies Quarterly 57, 4 (2013): 791–803.
Eric C. C. Chang and Wen-Chin Wu, “Preferential Trade Agreements, Income Inequality, and Authoritarian Survival,” Political Research Quarterly 69, 2 (2016): 281–294.
Dursun Peksen, “How Do Target Leaders Survive Economic Sanctions? The Adverse Effect of Sanctions on Private Property and Wealth,” Foreign Policy Analysis 13 (2017): 215–232.
Eric Arias, James R. Hollyer, and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Cooperative Autocracies: Leader Survival, Creditworthiness, and Bilateral Investment Treaties,” American Journal of Political Science 62, 4 (2018): 905–921.
Week 9: 經濟國策與國際談判
Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, “Aid Allocation and Targeted Development in an Increasingly Connected World,” International Organization 71, 4 (2017): 735–66.
Daniel W. Drezner, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?” International Organization 54, 1 (2000): 73–102.
Dean Lacy and Emerson M. S. Niou, “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats,” Journal of Politics 66, 1 (2004): 25–42.
Yoram Z. Haftel and Alexander Thompson, “Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral Investment Treaties,” International Organization 67, 2 (2013): 355–387.
Nikhil Kalyanpur and Abraham L. Newman, “Mobilizing Market Power: Jurisdictional Expansion as Economic Statecraft,” International Organization 73, 1 (2019): 1–34.
Week 10: 經濟國策與軍事衝突
Jean?Marc F. Blanchard, Edward D. Mansfield, and Norrin M. Ripsman, “The Political Economy of National Security: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence, and International Conflict,” Security Studies 9, 1–2 (1999): 1–14.
Erik Gartzke, “The Capitalist Peace,” American Journal of Political Science 51, 1 (2007): 166–191.
Patrick J. McDonald, “Peace through Trade or Free Trade?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, 4 (2004): 547–572.
David J. Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher, “Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 51, 2 (2007): 415–431.
Katja B. Kleinberg and Benjamin O. Fordham, “The Domestic Politics of Trade and Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 57, 3 (2013): 605–619.
Week 11: 經濟國策與兩岸關係
耿曙，〈經濟扭轉政治？中共「惠台政策」的政治影響〉，《問題與研究》，第48卷，第3期（2009）：1–32。
William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2016), Ch. 3 “Economics and China’s Grand Strategy,” Ch. 6 “Coercive Leverage across the Taiwan Strait.”
Kwei-Bo Huang, “The Politics of Mainland China’s Economic Statecraft in Relation to Current Cross-Strait Relations,” in China’s Economic Statecraft: Co-Optation, Cooperation And Coercion, by Mingjiang Li (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Company, 2017), 3–35.
Week 12: 經濟國策與核武擴散
Daniel Verdier, “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Exclusion in the Nuclear Proliferation Regime,” International Organization 62, 3 (2008): 439–476.
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Engaging North Korea: The Role of Economic Statecraft (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2011), Ch. 3 “The Coordination Problem and North Korea’s Foreign Economic Relations.”
Daniel W. Drezner, “An Analytically Eclectic Approach to Sanctions and Nonproliferation,” in Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, ed. Etel Solingen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 154–173.
Nicholas L. Miller, “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” International Organization 68, 4 (2014): 913–944.
Week 13: 經濟國策與人權保護
A. Cooper Drury and Yitan Li, “U.S. Economic Sanction Threats against China: Failing to Leverage Better Human Rights,” Foreign Policy Analysis 2, 4 (2006): 307–324.
Reed M. Wood, “‘A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation’: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976-2001,” International Studies Quarterly 52, 3 (2008): 489–513
Dursun Peksen, “Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights,” Journal of Peace Research 46, (2009): 59–77.
Clair Apodaca and Michael Stohl, “United States Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance,” International Studies Quarterly 43, 1 (1999): 185–198.
Week 14: 經濟國策與非傳統安全
Peter Andreas, “Criminalizing Consequences of Sanctions: Embargo Busting and Its Legacy,” International Studies Quarterly 49, 2 (2005): 335–360.
Bryan R. Early and Dursun Peksen, “Searching in the Shadows: The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Informal Economies,” Political Research Quarterly, 26, (2018), 1–14.
Jean-Paul Azam and Veronique Thelen, “Foreign Aid Versus Military Intervention in the War on Terror,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, 2 (2010): 237–261.
Herbert S. Lin, “Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force,” Journal of National Security Law & Policy 63, 4 (2010): 63–86.
Week 15: 經濟國策與政府反制
Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22, 2 (1997): 90–136.
Harry L. Clark, “Dealing with US Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign Countermeasures,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 20, 1 (1999): 61–96.
D. Tingley et al., “The Political Economy of Inward FDI: Opposition to Chinese Mergers and Acquisitions,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, 1 (2015): 27–57.
Christina L. Davis, Andreas Fuchs, and Kristina Johnson, “State Control and the Effects of Foreign Relations on Bilateral Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, 2 (2019): 405–438.
邱奕宏，〈外來直接投資與國家安全的權衡： 探討影響美國外資政策的政治〉，《政治學報》，第63期（2017）：1–32。
Week 16: 經濟國策的終止
Valentin L. Krustev and T. Clifton Morgan, “Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, 4 (2011): 351–376.
Fiona McGillivray and Allan C. Stam, “Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 2 (2004): 154–172.
Helen V. Milner and Dustin Tingley, “Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay,” International Interactions 39, 3 (2013): 389–401.
Peter Holmes, Jim Rollo, and L. Alan Winters, “Negotiating the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Arrangements,” National Institute Economic Review 238 (2016): 22–30.
Week 17: 期末口頭報告一
Week 18: 期末口頭報告二 |
|
評量方式
(僅供參考) |
|
|